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Abstract
The core objective of 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) is to provide a secured communication and high data rate for 4G users.
Even though 4G network provides security, there are loopholes which lead to several attacks in 4G network. One such attack is
desynchronization attack in 3GPP handover key management. This paper deliberates the vulnerability of desynchronization attack
that occurs when source acts as rogue base station in 3GPP. In addition, it discusses how this attack jeopardizes the communication
in 4G network and subsequently proposes a new scheme to overcome this attack. In the proposed scheme, the target generates its
own key rather than using the key generated by source node for future communication with target to achieve a secure communication
between the source and target base station in 4G LTE. The proposed scheme is simulated using network simulator 3 (NS-3). The
numerical analysis shows that the proposed scheme achieves a signiﬁcant reduction in the communication cost for key generation
and authentication in LTE.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
The LTE is a wireless communication standard commonly known as 4G LTE. It is developed by third Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) and based on packet switched network1 and Internet Protocol (IP). The network
architecture of LTE also called as Evolved Packet System (EPS) comprises of three components – User Equipment
(UE), Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC) as depicted
in Fig. 1. The communicating equipment is the mobile based and consists of Universal Subscriber Identity Module
(USIM), International mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) and the master key. Before the user enters into the network,
it must authenticate itself with the home server. The EPS-Authentication Key Agreement (AKA) protocol is used to
authenticate the user.
The E-UTRAN contains an evolved base station (eNodeB) and ensures radio communication between user and
evolved packet core (EPC). The eNodeBs are connected through an interface X2 and the interface S1 connects
eNodeB and EPC. The EPC comprises of mobility management entity (MME), Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway
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Fig. 1. EPS Architecture.
(P-GW), Home Subscriber Server (HSS), Serving Gateway (S-GW) and the Policy Control and Charging Rules
Function (PCRF). Here, MME is the signaling node in the EPC that is used for initiating authentication of the user.
It holds the location information for each user and then selects the appropriate gateway during the initial registration
process. The S1 interface connects MME and eNodeB (See Fig. 1). In addition, the MME also plays an important role
in handover signaling between LTE and 2G/3G networks.
The S-GW establishes the communication between the users with PDN gateway. The P-GW communicates with the
PDN gateway i.e., the external world using an interface known as SGi. The HSS is the central database which retains
all user and network information.
In spite of advantages in recent technology, there exist an equal amount of risks in terms of security. One such
security issue in LTE handover key management is desynchronization attack. It jeopardizes the communication which
can compromise the future keys. The desynchronization attack occurs due to the disruption of counter value by rogue
base station.
To address this issue, the paper proposes a scheme with double authentication to the target node and also the target
itself generates the key to be used for future communication rather than using the key generated by the source node.
Hence, the key used is not generated by rogue base station due to double authentication mechanism used in the
proposed scheme.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) To avoid desynchronization attack by recognizing the
existence of rogue base station 2) To provide security features such as double authentication, conﬁdentiality and
integrity between the participating entities in the proposed scheme 3) The proposed scheme is simulated using NS-3
with 4G LTE setup and 4) It achieves signiﬁcant reduction in communication cost.
This paper is organized into ﬁve sections. Related works are discussed in section 2. Section 3 contains the proposed
scheme for the prevention of rogue base station which causes desynchronization attack. Section 4 includes formal
analysis of the proposed scheme. Section 5 discusses the performance evaluation and simulation results. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. Related Works
Chan-Kyu et al. suggested a solution for desynchronization attack in LTE2. In the handover key management of
LTE, the key generation and NCC update has an integral role. The desynchronization attack arises when the updation
of the NCC is disrupted between the entities by an attacker and derives the key using horizontal key derivation by
compromising the source node. The desynchronization of the NCC value occurs owing to the rogue base station
attack. The scheme suggested an algorithm to update the key in optimal time, the minimal time to update the root key.
However, the update depends on time factor; this scheme is prone to attacks. The implementation of the scheme also
causes an additional overhead in the network. Subsequently, Sridevi et al. introduced a new entity known as certiﬁcate
authority into the system to overcome the vulnerability in the LTE handover key management3. It provides security
in terms of certiﬁcate, each entity requests certiﬁcate from the certiﬁcate authority for the communication with other
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Fig. 2. Handover Key Management using C-RNTI.
entities. All the entities are dependent on the certiﬁcate authority for ensuring the security. Since they are dependent to
a single device, there is a chance of bottleneck to take place in the network. This bottleneck occurs when all the entities
send request at the same moment. Nevertheless, the scheme is more cost effective and has bandwidth constraints.
Furthermore, Xiao et al. suggested a scheme to overcome the desynchronization attack in LTE handover key
management4. The new element is cell radio network temporary identiﬁer (C-RNTI) is introduced. As shown in Fig. 2,
the source eNodeB receives the key material i.e., the Next Hop key (NH key) is updated NH chaining counter (NCC)
times and NCC (NHNCC, NCC) from the MME in the last X2 handover as mentioned in Fig. 1. The UE sends about
the report of measurement to the source eNodeB. If the handover befalls, the source eNodeB then derives a new key
represented as KeNB∗ from KeNB or NH using vertical handover or horizontal handover. The source eNodeB demands
a handover including KeNB∗ and NCC to the target eNodeB. The MME receives the C-RNTI assigned by the target
node to the UE. It encrypts the C-RNTI with KSME and returns to the target node. Then, the UE receives NCC value
and cipher text from the target node and checks with its NCC value. When the NCC values are not equal then the
UE iterates until the NCC value becomes equal. After generating the NH key, the UE sends handover conﬁrmation
response to the target node. The switch request S1 path (see Fig. 2) is sent from the target node to the MME.
Subsequently, the NCC value is incremented by one then the MME estimates a new NH which is NHNCC+1 from
the KASME and current NH key. It forwards the pair (NHNCC+1, NCC+1) to the target eNodeB for the next handover.
The scheme avoids the desynchronization attack but the communication and computation costs are high because of n
number of communication between the entities.
The study5–11 have emphasized that, the prevention of security threats due to the rogue base station is lacking
to provide authentication and also results in the desynchronization attack between the communicants of the EPS
architecture during handover key management. This study has paved the way to propose a scheme to overcome
desynchronization attack in LTE. The next section discusses the proposed scheme.
3. Detailed Description of the Proposed Scheme
3.1 Proposed architecture
In 4G technology, the proposed work deals with an issue related to handover key management. In key management,
the session key between the source and target are compromised by increasing the NCC value to its highest value,
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Fig. 3. Proposed Architecture.
because of the failure in forward handover. The failure occurs when source enodeB becomes rouge BS, this in turn
derives all possible session key which can be used for communication between source and target.
As shown in Fig. 3, HSS initially sends NH key and NCC to the source node. If the source node is rogue it sets an
inﬁnite number as the NCC value. When the changed value is send to UE it checks with its database, if the value is
not equal then it sends NCC updation to the HSS indicating the source node is rogue. Subsequently, to communicate
with the target node, HSS authenticates the node using hash value from the target. After authentication, the user
communicates with the target node.
3.2 Message ﬂow of the proposed scheme
As shown in Fig. 4, the HSS sends the counter value and NH key to the source node. Source generates K∗eNB and
receives an incremented counter value from HSS, for each key generation the counter value is incremented. UE on
receiving the counter value compares the NCC value with its value. If the NCC values are equal the key for target node
is generated by the source using vertical key derivation. If the values are not equal UE sends a request to the HSS. The
target node computes a hash value and sends to HSS to indicate target node is genuine. The pre-shared master key in
target node and HSS are used to compute the hash value. The master key is given as the input to the cryptographic
hash algorithm to compute the hash value.
The HSS on receiving the value recomputes the hash value, if the hash value are equal HSS generates a new random
value and sends to target. The target node then generates a new key for future communication between UE and target.
4. Security Analysis
This section includes the informal discussion and analysis of the security issues in the proposed and the existing
scheme.
4.1 Authentication
Authentication is the process of identifying the genuine user in the network. The authentication of the user is
provided using existing EPS-AKA protocol. But, our proposed scheme includes hash value to provide authentication
to indicate that target node is genuine. The HSS checks hash value from the target. The HSS recomputes and checks
the hash value if they are equal target is said to be genuine node.
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Fig. 4. Message ﬂow of the Proposed Scheme.
Table 1. Comparative Analysis of Authentication.
Scheme UE-Source Source-UE Source-HSS
Chan-Kyu et al. 2014 Yes Yes No
Sridevi et al. 2015 Yes Yes No
Xiao et al. 2014 Yes Yes No
Proposed Yes Yes Yes
Table 2. Comparative Analysis of Conﬁdentiality.
Scheme UE-Source Source-UE
Chan-Kyu et al. 2014 Yes No
Sridevi et al. 2015 Yes No
Xiao et al. 2014 Yes Yes
Proposed Yes Yes
4.2 Conﬁdentiality
Conﬁdentiality is the process protecting the information from disclosure to unauthorized parties. The message
communication between the user and base station is encrypted in the proposed scheme. The key which is generated
by base station is used to encrypt the signaling messages. Thus, our scheme provides conﬁdentiality to the signaling
messages between all the correspondents.
4.3 Desynchronization attack prevention
In the existing system, the NCC values of the source is being changed when the source is rogue and thus
results in desynchronization attack. In the proposed scheme, the source is being checked using NCC value during
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Table 3. Comparative analysis of integrity.
Scheme UE-Source Source-UE Source-HSS
Chan-Kyu et al. 2014 No No No
Sridevi et al. 2015 Yes Yes No
Xiao et al. 2014 Yes Yes No
Proposed Yes Yes Yes
the authentication process. The source node sends the NCC value to UE. The HSS receives the NCC value from
source and it checks the NCC value to identify the rogue node in the LTE system. If the NCC value does not match
with the value in HSS database then the node is considered to be rogue base station and avoids further communication
with the rogue node.
4.4 Data integrity
Data Integrity refers to accuracy and consistency of the data during data transfer. In proposed scheme, the hash
value and key generated is encrypted using public key and decryption is possible only with the private key. The use of
hash value with asymmetric key encryption ensures data integrity.
4.5 Replay attack prevention
The use of nonce value in the proposed scheme keeps changing periodically, if an attacker performs replay attack
using previously sent nonce value, it is easy to identify the attacker who performs replay attack. The use of random
nonce value prevents replay attack.
5. Performance Evaluation
5.1 Simulation results
NS-3 is a discrete-event network simulator and used to develop an open simulation environment. The setup of IP
and non-IP based networks are supported by NS-3. It is built using C++ and Python12. The desynchronization attack
is simulated using NS-3 and the proposed scheme to avoid this attack is demonstrated using NS-3. Initially, the four
nodes are created and messages are sent from source to the target node in NS-3 which is shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Initial Communication between UE and HSS.
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In Fig. 6, the counter value is sent from HSS to source node and 128-bit key is generated using AES algorithm in
the source node. For each key generation, the counter value is incremented by 1. The generated key is sent to the target
node and also the incremented counter value is sent to the target node. Subsequently, the user receives the counter
value from target node and compares with its database. If the counter value is equal then it is noted that no attack is
performed and communication is established with the target node as shown in Fig. 7.
The attacker increments the counter value. The user on receiving the false value from the eNodeB checks with its
counter value as a result desynchronization attack occurs if the values are not equal. Furthermore to check the target
node, the key value is sent as an input to the target node to generate hash value. The HSS calculates the hash value and
checks with the received the hash value from the target. If the values are equal, the target node is genuine as depicted
in Fig. 8.
Fig. 6. Communication between HSS and Source.
Fig. 7. Key Generation at Source.
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Fig. 8. Generation of Hash Value to Authenticate Target Node.
Fig. 9. Communication Cost for Key Generation.
5.2 Numerical results
The total communication cost between entities of the existing and proposed schemes are depicted in Fig. 9.
The communication cost of key generation for the proposed scheme is calculated as follows. Communication cost for
key generation in bytes = HSS-Source + Source-Target+ Target-UE + Target-HSS = 440 bytes.
The communication cost is less for the proposed work when compared with other works, digital certiﬁcate is
proposed in Sridevi et al. which cost higher than other schemes. Xiao et al. introduced a new element to prevent
desynchronization attack and Chan-kya et al. designed a time variant system which all leads to a less cost effective
scheme. Whereas, the new scheme overcomes all the drawbacks and proposes a cost effective and secured scheme for
handover key management in LTE. The number of communication between the entities are reduced in the proposed
scheme in the absence of IPsec, which leads to cost effective scheme in LTE.
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Fig. 10. Communication Cost for Authentication of Target with HSS.
Communication cost for authentication in bytes for the proposed scheme = Target-HSS+HSS-Target = 140 bytes.
The comparison of communication cost for earlier works and the proposed scheme are summarized in Fig. 10. The
communication cost for authentication is less for the proposed scheme when compared with other works and the
proposed scheme is cost effective and also provides secured authentication scheme for the target node to authenticate
with HSS.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, a scheme is designed to prevent the rogue base station in the network before it communicates
the sensitive information. The proposed scheme overcomes the desynchronization problem due to rogue base
station in handover key management of 4G LTE network. It also provides a solution to prevent the 4G LTE from
desynchronization attack using the NCC value and also ensures that UE communicates with genuine target node. The
genuine target node is veriﬁed using the hash value and also it generates a key for future communication between UE
and target. As a result of the scheme, the security analysis and performance evaluation shows that the proposed scheme
is efﬁcient than the existing in terms of communication cost. The future work of this scheme can be incorporated in
LTE handover management in the absence of IPsec to avoid desynchronization attack.
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